I study an allocation mechanism of a single item in the presence of type-dependent externalities between bidders. The type-dependency introduces countervailing incentives and the allocation sometimes requires that types in an interior subset obtain their reservation utility. Furthermore,...

I analyze optimal auction design in the presence of linear type-dependent negative externalities. I characterize the properties of the optimal mechanism when externalities are “strongly decreasing” and “increasing” in the agent’s valuation and I discuss its implementation with...

We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative sizeof these three information elements. According to...

We investigate whether efficient collusive bidding mechanisms are affected by potential information leakage from bidders’ decisions to participate in them within the independent private values setting. We apply the concept of ratifiability introduced by Cramton and Palfrey (1995) and show that...