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Revenue non-equivalence in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry

Chandel, Shivangi; Sarkar, Shubhro - Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) - 2014

Using an example we show that the Revenue Equivalence in the Scoring Auctions, as postulated by Che (1993), no longer holds when the suppliers are asymmetric in their costs of production.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860132

Optimal Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders

Singh, Rajdeep; Povel, Paul - Econometric Society - 2004

second-price sealed bid auction that lets the insider win only if his bid is above a hurdle price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699653

Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach

Larson, Nathan; Elmaghraby, Wedad - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

auction formats that make bidding difficult and risky in different ways. We find that measures of `difficulty' provide a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211215

Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

Elmaghraby, Wedad J.; Larson, Nathan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 131-159

with three auction formats that make bidding difficult in different ways. We find that measures of ‘difficulty’ provide a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664594

Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions

Hendricks, Ken; Porter, Robert H. - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 3, (pp. 2073-2143). 2007

We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024584

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield that lies on the border of mechanism design and computer science and deals with mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Chapter 7. Advances in Auctions

Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 381-453). 2015

selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025452

(Mal-)practices of auctioneering on the English property market during the 19th century

Fasold, Stephan - In: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 63 (2022) 1, pp. 55-81

interests that played a deci- sive role in the establishment of the auction mechanism. The article provides an analysis of the … formal and informal rules of the auction trade for real estate and argues that 19 th century real estate auctions did not … than auction theory assumes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013262919

Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions : the case of water auctions

Donna, Javier; Espin-Sanchez, Jose-Antonio - 2013 - First version: December 10, 2010, This version: December 6, 2013

English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233151

Auctioning vs. grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

Alvarez González, Francisco; André, Francisco J. - 2013

-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. At the auction each firm anticipates his … as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it … would occur in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms' costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226080