better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in first …

signal’s informativeness, the all-pay auction raises lower revenue than the second-price auction, whereas the revenue ranking … between the all-pay and the first-price auction is ambiguous …

auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …

learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed …-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be … beneficial for any precision of the signal. -- Asymmetric auction ; first-price auction ; signaling …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in firstprice auctions. …

heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …