Showing 1 - 10 of 86
The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersed information. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider, however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simple call auction game where both auction prices and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275685
The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersed information. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider, however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simple call auction game where both auction prices and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003798364
The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012437539
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014322519
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000808963
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001169128
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513957
Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866465
Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866708
Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012