This paper presents five empirical tests of the popular modeling abstraction that assumes bids from online auctions with proxy bidding can be analyzed “as if” they were bids from a second price sealed-bid auction. The tests rely on observations of the magnitudes and timings of the top two...

This paper models sequential auctioning of two perfect substitutes by a strategic seller, who learns about demand from the first-auction price. The seller holds the second auction only when the remaining demand is strong enough to cover her opportunity cost. Bidding in anticipation of such a...

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumer behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific...

At Internet auction sites like eBay, similar goods are often sold in a sequence of auctions, separated by small amounts of time. Buyers can therefore benefit from forward-looking strategies that take into account available information about future auctions. This paper develops a model of such...

We model the contest among full-service advertising agencies as a score auction. The score auction allows the advertiser to select the agency that offers the best combination of creative quality and media cost, and to determine the contract price. To participate in the contest, each agency needs...