We consider the problem of mechanism design by a principal who has private information. We point out a simple condition under which the privacy of the principal's information is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism implemented by the principal coincides with the mechanism that would be...

Zheng has recently proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-private-value environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions on the bidders' value distribution pro le. We clarify the restrictions implied by these conditions....

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of...

We consider 2-bidder rst-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. Such auctions induce an inefficient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser, increases (reduces) the inefficiency of the market...

This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of linear equilibria in the Rochet-Vila model of market making. In contrast to most previous work on the existence of linear equilibria in models of market making, we do not impose independence of the underlying random...