We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Heterogeneous agents make two choices: whether to work in the public or private sector and which of two political parties to vote for. The model implies that when risk aversion is high, agents are more likely to elect...

We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Agents choose to work in the public or private sector and to vote Democrat or Republican. In equilibrium, when risk aversion is high, agents elect Democrats---the party promising more redistribution. The model predicts...

I investigate the effect of different measures of corporate taxes on stock returns. The results support the partisan politics cycle effect on equity returns. A high minus low (Hi-Lo) portfolio sorted by (Total Corporate Taxes/Total Assets) has an annual return of +3.8% during Republican...

I study the effect of partisan politics on stock returns in Latin America. There is a negative market reaction when left-wing parties win presidential elections. However, the observed democratic premium in the U.S. is not observed. Firms have higher returns when the president is from a Centrist...

We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Agents choose to work in the public or private sector and to vote Democrat or Republican. In equilibrium, when risk aversion is high, agents elect Democrats—the party promising more redistribution. The model predicts...