We investigate the relation between corporate governance characteristics of hostile takeover targets and the choice to employ 'harmful' resistance that is not perceived as being motivated by shareholders' interests. We find that harmful resistance is associated with firms where managers have...

We examine the nature of takeover resistance by investigating the determinants of the choice by target managers to take post-offer actions designed to aggressively frustrate the takeover bid, in preference to choosing passive resistance through tactics that just secure a better offer for...

Using instrumental variables, we find that having more antitakeover provisions is not only more likely to prevent a bid but also more likely to cause management resistance in the event of not doing so. The deterrent effect is likely to be decreasing in the cost to rival bidders of acquiring...

This paper develops a dynamic model of asset price behavior based upon the arrival and diffusion of rumors in a securities market. The model is based upon a time-homogeneous pure birth process in which the number of informed and uninformed traders varies probabilistically over time as learning...