Fallback bargaining is a bargaining procedure under which bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over all alternatives. They then fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives - starting with first choices, then adding second choices, and so on - until an...

We consider two person bargaining games with independent preferences, with and without bilateral incomplete information. We show that, both in the ultimatum game and in the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are fully consistent with all robust experimental...

In 1972, Harsanyi and Selten characterized a one parameter asymmetric Nash solution. In this note I do the analog for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. By dropping symmetry and adding a restrivted version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives to the set of axioms that lead to the...

We axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are linear in every rank-ordered subset of Rn+. Such functions, the so-called Choquet integrals, have been widely used in the theories of collective and individual choice. We refer to...

The Lorenz-Pareto Optimal Frontier of a collective choice problem indentifies a (usually quite large) subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. We study the basic properties of Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and in particular...

This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the re vealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets, the exercice is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994).