In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

The authors develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs.

This paper deals with N-Person sequential bargaining games with complete information (perfect or almost perfect information). For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements.

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.