We study a sender/receiver game in which a large number of players engage in repeated anonymous interactions, over a long time horizon. We expand the standard sender/receiver game by adding a neutral action to the receiver's action space.

We study a sender/receiver game in which a large number of players engage in repeated anonymous interactions, over a long time horizon. We expand the standard sender/receiver game by adding a neutral action to the receiver's action space.

This paper addresses the issue of selecting pricing institutions in a bilateral monopoly. Suppose a bayer and seller can benefit from exchanging one unit of a good. The selelr is entitled to select the pricing institution. He can either make a take-it-leave-it offer or enter a bargaining game.

Recent research on household behavior suggests that, ceteris paribus, a woman's "power" within a household influences consumption and time allocation choices. From an empirical point of view, a central stumbling block in this line of inquiry has been identification of sources of "power" that can...