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The Limit of Public Policy: Endogenous Preferences.

Bar-Gill, O.; Fershtman, C. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 2001

In designing public policy it is not enough to consider the possible reaction of individuals to the chosen policy. Public policy may also affect the formation of preferences and norms in a society. The endogenous evolution of preferences, in addition to introducing a conceptual difficulty in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647225

МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЕ «ГОРИЗОНТАЛЬНОГО» ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ АГЕНТОВ С ПОМОЩЬЮ НАБОРА ИГР

БОРИСОВИЧ, СОКОЛОВСКИЙ ДМИТРИЙ - In: Бизнес Информ (2013) 3, pp. 90-94

Тематикой статьи является моделирование горизонтального и вертикального взаимодействия экономических субъектов, реализуемое, в частности, контрактами о...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011216728

Carrot and Stick Games.

Kline, J.J. - Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, College … - 1998

In a carrot game for a player, that player must help his opponent in order to get a desired response. In a stick game for a player, that player must hurt his opponent to get a desired response. We show that most all smooth monotonic two player games can be classified as: carrot for both, carrot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005630790

Hoe Does Selfishness Affect Well-Being?.

Milchtaich, I. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruis, can actually make things worse for all people involved? This paper tackles this question in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634090

A Behavioral Learning Process in Games.

Laslier, J.-F.; Topol, R.; Walliser, B. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1999

The paper studies a behavioral learning process where an agent plays, at each period, an action with a probability which is proportional to the cumulative utility he got in the past with that action. The so-called CPR learning rule and the dynamic process it induces are formally stated and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618897

On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games.

Dekel, E.; Scotchmer, S. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1999

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783642

Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.

Masclet, D.; Noussair, C.; Tucker, S.; Villeval, M.C. - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2001

In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786817

Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Extensive Form Games.

Spiegler, R. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1999

that support it. Specifically, they face ex-post criticism, which consists of a (deterministic) theory of the opponent …'s strategy as well as an alternative recommended strategy. The theory must be consistent with the history and there can be no … consistent theory that is simpler. The alternative strategy must do better than the player's strategy against the theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675397