Despite the pervasiveness of reciprocal behavior, it has received little attention in the economic literature. In this paper, I consider an evolutionary model of reciprocity. The main findings of this paper are that evolution can support reciprocal behavior for the fraction of population, which...

I replace the assumption that an agent makes an optimal choice by an assumption that the agent executes a computational algorithm directed at finding a choice that is good at the time the choice is made. The algorithm utilizes the individual's own information, and information about choices of...

This paper develops a model of individual adjustment subject to mistakes. In this case when mistakes are assumed i.i.d., this process produces a probability distribution of agents decision whose evolution is determined by Fokker-Planck equation. This distribution converges to the unique,...

This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing incentive schemes under bounded rationality. It starts from a standard principal-agent model and then superimposes an assumption of boundedly rational behavior on the part of the agent. Boundedly rational behavior is modeled as an...