Using a data set of bank loans to Greek firms during the period of the Greek sovereign crisis, we provide empirical evidence that firms affiliated with groups are less likely to default on their bank loan during a credit crunch, compared to stand-alone firms. We show that the lower default risk...

We study whether formal enforcement actions, imposed on U.S. banks during 2000-2014 for serious financial safety and internal control problems, affect the probability that punished banks become targets of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find an increase in the probability of punished banks'...

We extend the U.S. bank M&As literature by examining bidder announcement abnormal returns in deals involving both public and private targets over a 32-years examination period. Our main findings document the existence of a listing effect in our sample. Banks gain when they acquire private firms...

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated...

In this paper, we provide novel evidence of shareholder value creation in European bank M&As. We show that since 2009, bidders realize approximately 3% higher abnormal returns compared to the previous years; the returns being accompanied by significant improvements in long-term profitability....