We study how financial system architecture evolves through the development of banks and financial markets. The predominant existing view is that banks and markets compete, which often contradicts actual patterns of development. We show that banks and markets exhibit three forms of interaction:...

We develop a model in which bank culture improves upon outcomes attainable with incentive contracting. The bank designs a second-best incentive contract to induce the desired managerial effort allocation across growth and safety, but this induces excessive growth relative to the first best, a...

This paper develops a theory in which heterogeneity in bank capital choices arises in a general equilibrium despite ex ante identical banks. In a future state, the credit market is partially frozen in a crisis - high-capital banks have continued access to funding liquidity but low-capital banks...

This paper develops a theoretical model of bank culture. The model is based on a multitasking problem within a bank that involves the bank designing an optimal incentive contract to induce the desired allocation of managerial effort across growth and safety. There is always excessive growth in...

We examine the effect of bank mergers on the price and availability of credit in the residential mortgage market. We find that, compared to non-acquiring banks in the same local market, acquiring banks that gain large market shares charge significantly higher interest rates but also lend larger...