Theoretical literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Edmans and Liu, 2011) argues that inside debt – pension benefits and deferred compensation – has debt-like payoffs, and can therefore curb executives' excessive risk-taking incentives created by equity holdings. We test this theory in the...

This article examines the interrelations among five ownership and board characteristics in a sample of 260 banks and Savings-and-Loan Holding Companies (SLHCs). These governance characteristics, designed to reduce agency problems between shareholders and managers are insider ownership,...

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debtholders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995-2009...

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995-2009...

Using a sample of publicly traded banks from 56 countries over the 2000-2017 period, we examine the impact of government ownership on banks’ cost of equity. We find that banks with a larger share of government ownership suffer a higher cost of equity. Our empirical analyses also suggest that...

Using a sample of publicly listed banks from 62 countries over the 1991-2017 period, we investigate the impact of capital on banks' cost of equity. Consistent with the theoretical prediction that more equity in the capital mix leads to a fall in firms' costs of equity, we find that better...

Using a sample of publicly listed banks from 62 countries over the 1991-2017 period, we investigate the impact of capital on banks' cost of equity. Consistent with the theoretical prediction that more equity in the capital mix leads to a fall in firms' costs of equity, we find that better...