We estimate differences in funding costs between the largest banks and the rest of the industry. Using deposit rates offered at the branch level, we eliminate many non-risk-related differences between banks. We document significant and persistent pricing advantages at the largest banks for...

In this paper, we argue that bank-sponsored prime institutional money market funds (PI-MMFs) are different from non-bank-sponsored PI-MMFs. This difference can arise because the sponsoring bank holding companies (BHCs) can extend shadow insurance to ailing affiliated MMFs. We hypothesize that...

Bank stability depends on information. Regulators can allow banks to release some information about their safety and soundness. This paper shows how dividend regulation and information interact to affect bank stability. In the model, wealth-expropriation, excess cash flow, and signaling...

We identify a new source of bank consolidation in the United States. For decades, boththe financial and real sides of the economy have experienced considerable consolidation. Weshow that banking-sector consolidation is, in part, a consequence of real-sector consolidation;because small banks are...

We identify a new source of bank consolidation in the United States. For decades, both the financial and real sides of the economy have experienced considerable consolidation. We show that banking-sector consolidation is, in part, a consequence of real-sector consolidation; because small banks...

We argue that bank holding companies (BHCs) extend shadow insurance to the prime institutionalmoney market funds (PI-MMFs) they sponsor and that PI-MMFs price this shadow insurance bycharging investors significantly higher expense ratios and paying lower net yields. We provide evidence that...