We examine the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations. Banks, not internalizing fire sale externalities, overinvest in risky assets and underinvest in liquid assets in the competitive equilibrium. Capital requirements can alleviate the inefficiency, but banks...

The current pandemic has been a human mobility shock to economic activity. Using the geographic locations of bank branches, we calculate a bank's exposure to mobility declines and evaluate its impact on performance. We find that U.S. banks' stability, profitability, and asset quality are...

I use the financial crisis of 2008 as a natural experiment to identify the value of non-financial firms' stake in the banking system. Unrated firms underperform investment grade rated firms when Lehman Brothers fails, and overperform when the Treasury injects capital into the nine largest US...

This paper examines the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations in a model characterized by fire sale externalities. In the model, banks can insure against potential liquidity shocks by hoarding sufficient precautionary liquid assets. However, it is never...

This paper examines the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations in a model characterized by fire sale externalities. In the model, banks can insure against potential liquidity shocks by hoarding sufficient precautionary liquid assets. However, it is never...