This paper investigates whether the fair value accounting for available-for-sale (AfS) securities and the capital regulation permit to shift risk from shareholders to creditors. Using a sample of 5,510 firm-year observations generated from 754 unique U.S. banks from 1998 to 2013, we find that...

We exploit an informational shock to the firm information environment to examine the relationship between unaffiliated bankers on corporate boards and conditional conservatism. We find that after the information shock, firms with unaffiliated bankers on board experience a statistically and...

This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation, and its consequences for risk and performance. We find that banks with short-term investment intensity pay more cash bonus, exhibit higher risk and perform more poorly than banks with longer-term...

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud triggers reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks'...

This paper examines the role of certain fair value accounting (FVA) outcomes in compensation of US bank CEOs. The use of FVA in compensation invites an agency cost - the clawback problem - if cash compensation is based on unrealized profits that may reverse in the future. At the same time FVA...