We study the impact of a government-mediated takeover of weak small banks by stronger large banks in India during the recent banking crisis on loan performance. Our within borrower-time and between banks tests show a 25% reduction in delinquency. Evidence on mechanisms suggests that borrowers...

We examine the effects of CEO turnover in banks. Incoming bank CEOs face problems from information asymmetry because banks' operations are opaque and bank risk can change dramatically in a short time. Incoming bank CEOs may therefore change bank policies to manage their personal risks. Since CEO...

Though the monetary policy transmission and financial intermediation literatures have respectively highlighted the role of the “bank credit channel” and relationship banking, the effect of relationship banking on the transmission of monitory policy has not been investigated. In this paper,...

We ask whether regulatory forbearance on bank loans contributes to deterioration in the governance of borrowing firms. More exposed firms experience a reduction in board independence and external monitoring, an increase in management compensation including transactions with connected entities,...

We examine whether measures of audit quality are able to measure the quality of audit in banks. We make use of a unique setting where the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) provided an accurate measure of asset quality in banks. We first attempt to establish that the RBI revealed asset quality is a...

We examine the effect of CEO turnover on earnings management in banks. Since banking is intrinsically an opaque activity, we hypothesize that an incoming CEO of a bank is more likely to manage earnings than a counterpart in a non financial firm. To identify the hypothesized effects, we exploit...

We examine the Indian bank asset quality review, which doubled the declared loan delinquency rate. Relative economic stability during the exercise and the absence of a capital backstop together make it unique. We find that the expected reduction in information asymmetry does not automatically...