To meet short-term benchmarks, lenders may alter their monitoring behavior, providing a channel for short-termism incentives to spill over into the corporate sector. We find that lenders with short-termism incentives enforce material covenant violations at higher rates. Further, they target...

We provide causal evidence of the deposits channel of monetary policy transmission in a newsetting, but show that bank entry can reduce or even reverse the relationship between depositmarket structure and monetary policy pass-through. We build a simple model of monetary policytransmission when...

We study how supervisory coverage affects syndicated lending. Relying on an unexpected change in supervisory coverage, we document that the costs of bank credit for borrowers excluded from supervision decrease by approximately 18% relative to an otherwise similar control group. We also find that...

We study how regulation limiting ESG policies distorts financial market outcomes. In 2021 Texas enacted laws that prohibit municipalities from contracting with banks with certain ESG policies, leading to the exit of five of the largest municipal bond underwriters from the state. Issuers...

We estimate the effect of carbon pricing policy on bank credit to greenhouse gas emitting firms by studying cap-and-trade legislation. Our analyses exploit a discontinuity in the embedded free-permit threshold of the federal Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill and the geographic restrictions...

We directly measure banks' monitoring of syndicated loans. Banks typically demand borrower information on at least a monthly basis. About 20% of loans involve active monitoring (i.e., site visits or third-party appraisals). Monitoring increases with the lead bank's incentives and the value of...

Capital surcharges on global systemically important banks (GSIBs) decrease lending to firms but do not have any real effects. Banks subject to higher surcharges reduce loan commitments relative to other banks. In response to surcharges, GSIBs also lower their estimates of firm risk. Firms' total...