We review the banking literature with the view of identifying systemic externalities arising from bank failures. We are particularly interested in how such externalities may depend on the characteristics of the financial system at the time of failure, and on the characteristics of the failing...

We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks, using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2014. We show that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. In addition, the FDIC incurs higher costs in such auctions, amounting to 16.4...

We review the banking literature with the view of identifying systemic externalities arising from bank failures. We are particularly interested in how such externalities may depend on the characteristics of the financial system at the time of failure, and on the characteristics of the failing...

We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks. Using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2016, we find that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. However, the FDIC incurs larger costs in such auctions, amounting to 18.4 percent...

We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks, using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2014. We show that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. In addition, the FDIC incurs higher costs in such auctions, amounting to 16.4...