In a global game, I show that creditor bailins, when well-designed, can attain the exact same level of bank stability as costly creditor bailouts. This result holds for both risk-averse and risk-neutral creditors. Because bailouts are costly but do not necessarily provide a stability advantage,...

This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when the regulator's announcement of the intervention delay endogenously affects the depositors' run propensity. Given intervention, the regulator either liquidates the remaining illiquid assets (``prompt corrective...

This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when a resolution causes inefficiencies. The regulator observes depositors' withdrawals at the bank level and needs to decide on how many withdrawals to tolerate before intervening to impose a mandatory stay. The...

We analyze the question whether and when access to refinancing via repurchase agreements as opposed to asset liquidation increases efficiency to financial intermediators ('banks'). By pledging assets in form of a repo contract the bank can raise cash, by this preventing to forgo returns on sold...