We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securization:...

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation during the financial crisis is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds little evidence that the securitization process impeded the ability of lenders to renegotiate home mortgages,...

We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment-reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization:...

We study the causal effect of bank credit rating downgrades on the supply of bank lending. The identification strategy exploits the asymmetric impact of sovereign downgrades on the ratings of banks at the sovereign bound relative to bank that are not at the bound as a result of rating agencies'...

We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securization:...

In dynamic models of asset markets with asymmetric information and endogenous screening, the anticipation of signaling through delayed sales incentivizes originators to exert greater effort ex ante. A central prediction in those models is a positive relationship between screening effort and the...