We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is efficient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures the...

We examine financial intermediation when banks can offer deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We show that the risk allocation is efficient if there is no workout of banking crises. In this case, banks will shift part of the risk to depositors. In contrast, under a...

We investigate a banking system subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks and show that without deposit rate control, the banking system collapses with certainty. Any initial level of reserves will delay the collapse but not avoid it. Even without a banking collapse, the economy still converges...

We examine whether the economy can be insured against banking crises with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We study banking competition and show that the private sector insures the banking system through such contracts, and banking crises are avoided, provided that...

What are the quantitative macroeconomic effects of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB)? I study this question in a nonlinear DSGE model with occasional financial crises, which is calibrated and combined with US data to estimate sequences of structural shocks. Raising capital buffers during...

What are the quantitative effects of countercyclical capital buffers (CCyB)? I study this question in the context of a nonlinear DSGE model with a financial sector that is subject to occasional panics. A calibrated version of the model is combined with US data to estimate sequences of structural...

This paper analyzes banking crises using a quantitative model with equilibrium default for both firms and banks. The main results are: 1) small open economies have larger banking crises than closed or large economies. Constant international rates do not mitigate interbank spreads and amplify...

During banking crises, regulators often relax their normal requirements and refrain from closing financially troubled banks. I estimate the real effects of such regulatory forbearance by comparing differences in state-level economic outcomes by the amount of forbearance extended during the U.S....

This paper analyzes the private production of safe assets and its implications for financial stability. Financial intermediaries (FIs) originate loans, exert hidden effort to improve loan quality, and create safe assets by issuing debt backed by the safe payments from (i) their own loans and...