We construct a model of a bank's optimal funding choice, where the bank negotiates with both safety-driven short-term bondholders and (mostly) risk-taking long-term bondholders. We establish that investor demands for safety create a negative relationship between the bank's capital choices and...

The investment fund sector has expanded dramatically since the crisis of 2008-2009. As the sector grows, so do the implications of its risk-taking for the wider financial system and real economy. This paper provides empirical evidence for the existence of widespread risk-taking incentives in the...

In this paper, we provide evidence for a risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the euro area that works through an increase in shadow banks' total asset growth and their risk assets ratio. Our dataset covers the period 2003Q1 - 2017Q3 and includes, in addition to the standard...

In this paper, we provide evidence for a risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the euro area that works through an increase in shadow banks' total asset growth and their risk assets ratio. Our dataset covers the period 2003Q1 - 2017Q3 and includes, in addition to the standard...

An outside stakeholder’s commitment to bail out a levered investment fund mightencourage the fund manager to take extreme risks. But what if the bailout were harsh?The loan would have a penalty rate and the manager would have to sacrifice partequity interest in the fund. I show that as the...

Since the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary Fund "broke the buck," money market funds (MMFs) have been the subject of ongoing policy debate. Many commentators view MMFs as a key contributor to the crisis because widespread redemption demands during the days following the Lehman...

While simpler than risk-based capital requirements, the leverage ratio may encourage bank risk-taking. This paper examines the activity of broker-dealers affiliated with bank holding companies (BHCs) and broker-dealers not affiliated with BHCs in the repurchase agreement (repo) market to test...

I embed shadow banks in a quantitative general equilibrium model in which limited liability and deposit insurance can lead regulated banks to provide socially inefficient risky loans. Higher capital requirements can eliminate excessive risk at the cost of lower liquidity provision. In general...

What constitutes shadow banking has been described by the international financial institutions, such as FSB, IOSCO, ECB and European Commission. A common characteristic is that several of the shadow banking activities are outside the banking field but are likely to have an impact on the banking...