We investigate the impact of changes in capital of European banks on their risk-taking behavior from 1992 to 2006, a time period covering the Basel I capital requirements. We specifically focus on the initial level and type of regulatory capital banks hold. First, we assume that risk changes...

We empirically examine whether the way a bank might use loan loss provisions to smooth its income is influenced by its ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. Using a panel of European commercial banks, we find evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use...

We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is influenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country's regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We find that corruption in lending is higher when state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher...

This paper investigates the impact of banks' political connections on their ability to collect deposits under two different deposit insurance regimes (blanket guarantee and limited guarantee). We use a unique hand-collected dataset that identifies the political connections of Indonesian...

This paper investigates the impact of banks' political connections on their ability to collect deposits under two different deposit insurance regimes (blanket guarantee and limited guarantee). We estimate a simultaneous equations model of supply and demand for funds using quarterly data for...

We empirically investigate whether a bank's decision to recapitalize is influenced by the separation between voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner. We use a novel dataset on bank ultimate control and ownership structure of 442 European commercial banks to estimate an...