We document that the structure of syndicates affects loan renegotiations. Lead banks with large retained shares have positive effects on renegotiations. In contrast, more diverse syndicates deter renegotiations, but only for credit lines. The former result can be explained with coordination...

Shadow banks had a negligible presence in the US corporate loan market in the 1990s, but by 2016 they funded about 45% of the outstanding corporate term loans. Consistent with banking theories on liquidity provision, shadow banks remained absent from the credit line business. Nonetheless, they...

This paper empirically explores the monitoring behavior of banks. We are able to infer bank monitoring activity by observing changes in internally-generated risk metrics for corporate credits. We use these measures of monitoring activity to better understand the bank monitoring motives and...

The Basel I Accord introduced a discontinuity in required capital for undrawn credit commitments. While banks had to set aside capital when they extended commitments with maturities in excess of one year, short-term commitments were not subject to a capital requirement. The Basel II Accord...

We argue that the defining feature of large and complex banks that makes their failures messy is their reliance on runnable financial liabilities that confer liquidity or money-like services that may be impaired or destroyed in bankruptcy. To make large bank failures more orderly, we advocate...

The notion that some banks are “too big to fail” builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of their disorderly failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: Large, complex, or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they...