In this paper, we exploit a natural experiment in which thrifts in several states witnessed an exogenous reduction in supervisory attention to assess the effect of supervision on financial institutions' willingness to take risk. We show that the affected institutions took on much more risk than...

We exploit an exogenous reduction in bank supervision to demonstrate a causal effect of supervisory resources on financial institutions' willingness to take risk. The additional risk took the form of more risky loans, faster asset growth, and a greater reliance on low quality capital. This...

In this study, I model the predictors and manifestations of bank stress during the financial crisis using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause model. Unlike most early warning models that predict failure probabilities, this paper develops a framework for predicting a broader notion of bank stress...

We investigate how liquidity regulations affect banks by examining a dormant monetary policy tool that functions as a liquidity regulation. For causal inference, we use a regression kink design that relies on the variation in a marginal high-quality liquid asset (HQLA) requirement around an...

We investigate how liquidity regulations affect banks by examining a dormant monetary policy tool that functions as a liquidity regulation. Our identification strategy uses a regression kink design that relies on the variation in a marginal high-quality liquid asset (HQLA) requirement around an...

Inconsistently applied regulations are a hallmark of the U.S. banking system. Because many regulations only apply to a subset of banks, competition and other interactions in lending and deposit markets can both contribute meaningfully to a regulation's overall effect and also invalidate the...