We examine the effectiveness of bank regulation in the light of creditor diversity. Our theory suggests a bank can increase its value by matching the riskiness of its securities and the risk tolerance of its diverse creditors. Even a well-capitalized bank might not eliminate financial fragility...

We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resulting distortion in...

We evaluate the effects of post-crisis liquidity regulation on the U.S. banking system. We find that regulated banks have substantially improved their liquidity ratios by holding more liquidity buffers and terming out their liabilities. However, some liquidity transformation has migrated to...

We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resulting distortion in...

This paper investigates, theoretically and empirically, the effects of liquidity regulation on the banking system. We document that the current quantity-based liquidity rule has reduced banks' liquidity risks. However, the mandated liquidity buffer appears to crowd out bank lending and lead to a...

We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resulting distortion in...