Supranational resolution of insolvent banks does not necessarily improve welfare. Supranational regulators are more inclined to bail-out banks indebted towards international creditors because they take into account cross-border contagion. When banks' creditors are more likely to be bailed out,...

Sector-specific macroprudential regulations can increase the riskiness of credit to other sectors. First, using cross-country bank-level data we find that after a tightening of household-specific macroprudential policy during a credit expansion, banks with larger portfolios of residential...

We present a semi-structural model of default risk, which is a function of loan and borrower characteristics, economic conditions, and the regulatory environment. We use this model to simulate bank credit losses for stress-testing purposes and to calibrate borrower-based macroprudential tools....

Sector-specific macroprudential regulations increase the riskiness of credit to other sectors. Using firm-level data, this paper computed the measures of the riskiness of corporate credit allocation for 29 advanced and emerging economies. Consistently across these measures, the paper finds that...

Bank holding companies invest in risky projects through regulated bank entities and sell projects for a fee, thus engaging in shadow banking. To increase the fee income, BHCs guarantee sold projects with bank proceeds. When demand for financial assets is high, BHCs expand their own bank...