We take a macroprudential approach to analyze the optimal lending policy for the central bank, focusing on externalities that policy imposes on private markets. Lending against high-quality collateral protects central banks against losses but can adversely affect liquidity creation in markets...

The notion that some banks are “too big to fail” builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of their disorderly failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: Large, complex, or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they...

Using information from bonds issued over the past twenty years, this study finds that the largest banks have a cost advantage vis-à-vis their smaller peers. This cost advantage may not be entirely due to investors' belief that the largest banks are “too big to fail” because the study also...

We consider a model in which banks vulnerable to liquidity crises may receive support from the lender of last resort (LLR). Higher liquidity standards, though costly to banks, give the LLR more time to find out the systemic implications of denying support to the banks in trouble. By modifying...