This paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives. From...

This paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives. From...

This paper shows that the abolition of state guarantees to publicly owned banks in Germany resulted in an increase in funding costs at German savings banks. Rather than being the result of increased market discipline, the increase in funding costs is shown to be driven by spillover effects from...

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously...

In attempting to promote bank stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) provides a framework that seeks to control the amount of tail risk that large banks take in their trading books. However, banks around the world suffered sizeable trading losses during the recent crisis....

After the destructive impact of the global financial crisis of 2008, many believe that pre-crisis financial market regulation did not take the "big picture" of the system suffciently into account and, subsequently, financial supervision mainly "missed the forest for the trees". As a result, the...

Prior to the Great Depression, regulators imposed double liability on bank shareholders to ensure financial stability and protect depositors. Under double liability, shareholders of failing banks lost their initial investment and had to pay up to the par value of the stock in order to compensate...

Pierret (2015) presents empirical analysis of the solvency-liquidity nexus for the banking system, documenting that a shock to the level of banks' solvency risk is followed by lower short-term debt. Conversely, higher short-term debt Granger-causes higher solvency risk. These results point...