Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001781983
The industrial organization approach to banking is extended to analyze the effects of interbank market activity and regulatory liquidity requirements on bank behavior. A multi-stage decision situation allows for considering the interaction between credit risk and liquidity risk of banks. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344667
Instruments for credit risk transfer arise endogenously from and interact with optimizing behavior of their users. This is particularly true with credit derivatives which are usually OTC contracts between banks as buyers and sellers of credit risk. Recent literature, however, does not account...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003608811
Instruments for credit risk transfer arise endogenously from and interact with optimizing behavior of their users. This is particularly true with credit derivatives which are usually OTC contracts between banks as buyers and sellers of credit risk. Recent literature, however, does not account...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010295935
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001956337
We analyze disclosure of multiple pieces of information by a bank supervisor to a continuum of investors. Specifically, we present a model to explain why a banking authority, observing the state of the banking system, is willing to commit to perform stress tests, and disclose their results....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110540
The industrial organization approach to banking is extended to analyze the effects of interbank market activity and regulatory liquidity requirements on bank behavior. A multi-stage decision situation allows for considering the interaction between credit risk and liquidity risk of banks. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110546
The game-theoretical analysis of this paper shows that stress tests that cover the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be performed by institutional supervisors to improve welfare. In a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion we show that a banking authority can create value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009674818
This paper argues that stress tests encompassing the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be designed to improve welfare. We develop a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion to show that a banking supervisor can create value when he commits to disclose the stress-testing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339955
The game-theoretical analysis of this paper shows that stress tests that cover the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be performed by institutional supervisors to improve welfare. In a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion we show that a banking authority can create value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012988806