Shadow banks had a negligible presence in the US corporate loan market in the 1990s, but by 2016 they funded about 45% of the outstanding corporate term loans. Consistent with banking theories on liquidity provision, shadow banks remained absent from the credit line business. Nonetheless, they...

Our study of banks' corporate loan pricing policies in the United States over the past two decades shows that the loan spreads between riskier and safer borrowers decrease in periods of easy compared to periods of tight monetary policy. This interest rate discount is robust to borrower-, loan-,...

The notion that some banks are “too big to fail” builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of disorderly bank failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: large, complex or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they...

In this paper, we show that when banks increase their use of wholesale funding they shorten the maturity of loans to corporations. This effect appears to be linked to banks' exposure to rollover risk resulting from their increasing use of short-term uninsured funding. Banks that use more...

This paper investigates the incentives for banks to bias their internally generated risk estimates. We are able to estimate bank biases at the credit level by comparing bank-generated risk estimates within loan syndicates. The biases are positively correlated with measures of regulatory capital,...

This paper investigates the incentives for banks to bias their internally generated risk estimates. We are able to estimate bank biases at the credit-level by comparing bank generated risk estimates within loan syndicates. The biases are positively correlated with measures of regulatory capital,...

In an investigation of banks' loan pricing policies in the United States over the past two decades, this study finds supporting evidence for the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy. We show that banks charge lower spreads when they lend to riskier borrowers relative to the spreads they...

The notion that some banks are “too big to fail” builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of their disorderly failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: Large, complex, or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they...

We build on the estimated sectoral effects of climate transition policies from the general equilibrium models of Jorgenson et al. (2018), Goulder and Hafstead (2018), and NGFS (2022a) to investigate U.S. banks’ exposures to transition risks. Our results show that while banks’ exposures are...