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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773115
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010386045
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Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - In: Games and economic behavior 103 (2017), pp. 30-40
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792269
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462