In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that...

Several contractual situations are such that the parties may 'step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include employer-employee negotiations, divorce and inheritance procedures, and arbitration. To analyse such cases we...

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that...

We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a particular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica, 1997) of an extension of...

Several contractual situations are such that the parties may `step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include some forms of employer- employee negotiations, divorce procedures and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop...

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that...

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that...

Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are...

In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised,...

Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are...