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We present a generalization of the standard random-search model of unemployment in which firms hire multiple workers and in which the hiring process is time-consuming as well as costly. We follow Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) and assume that wages are determined by continuous bargaining between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599523
We present a generalization of the standard random-search model of unemployment in which firms hire multiple workers and in which the hiring process is time-consuming as well as costly. We follow Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) and assume that wages are determined by continuous bargaining between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934644
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011717349
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011564173
We present a generalization of the standard random-search model of unemployment in which firms hire multiple workers and in which the hiring process is time-consuming as well as costly. We follow Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) and assume that wages are determined by continuous bargaining between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674212
What are the sources of rapid wage growth during a worker's early career? To address this question, I construct and estimate a model of strategic wage bargaining with on-the-job search to explore three different components of wages: general human capital, match-specific capital, and outside...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977926
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We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is charaterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090931
This research introduces the sequential bargaining to the standard screening model by allowing the agent to propose new contracts with strategic delay after the rejection of the principal's offer. We have found that if the difference between the types of agent are sufficiently large, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069296