We study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites. Observing sellersʼ choices of prices and sites, but not quality, buyers choose which site to visit. A sellerʼs choices of prices can direct buyersʼ search and signal quality. A unique...

In this paper, we introduce private information into a market with search frictions and evaluate the relative efficiency of two pricing mechanisms, price posting and bargaining. Each seller chooses investment that determines the quality of the good. This quality is the seller's private...

In this paper I construct a search monetary model with capital accumulation where money and goods are both divisible. Agents in matches determine the terms of trade through a sequential bargaining process and they face trading restrictions that require the quantity of money traded not to exceed...

In this paper I construct a search monetary model with capital accumulation where money and goods are both divisible. Agents in matches determine the terms of trade through a sequential bargaining process and they face trading restrictions that require the quantity of money traded not to exceed...