The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold-up problem. At the first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship-specific investment. There is no contract, so at the second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has...

We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence of a monotonic Nash...

There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international 'trade' negotiations. Different countries, firms and activists groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to...

There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international 'trade' negotiations. Different countries, firms, and activist groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to...