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[Rezension von: Muthoo, Abhinay, Bargaining theory with applications]

Peters, Hans J. M. - In: De economist : Netherlands economic review ; quarterly … 148 (2000) 5, pp. 699-700

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001563762

Characterizations of bargaining solutions by properties of their status quo sets

Peters, Hans J. M. - In: Collective decision making : views from social choice …, (pp. 231-247). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003997079

Dynamics and axiomatics of the equal area bargaining solution

Calvo, Emilio; Peters, Hans J. M. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 29 (2000) 1, pp. 81-92

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001477053

Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions

Tijs, Stef - In: Game-theoretic models of bargaining, (pp. 215-231). 1985

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001260233

Risk aversion in bargaining : the advantage of having a rational opponent

Köbberling, Veronika; Peters, Hans J. M. - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001573081

Minimax regret and efficient bargaining under uncertainty

Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans J. M. - In: Games and economic behavior 34 (2001) 1, pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001548589

The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems

Köbberling, Veronika; Peters, Hans J. M. - In: Journal of economic theory 110 (2003) 1, pp. 154-175

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001767027

Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Peters, Hans J. M.; Zank, Horst - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 33 (2004) 1, pp. 145-158

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002506285

Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players

Calvo, Emilio; Peters, Hans J. M. - In: Games and economic behavior 52 (2005) 1, pp. 20-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003006549

Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory

Peters, Hans J. M. - 1992

Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013518635