A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, the case with climate change mitigation, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive arrangements; significant under-provision must be...

In uni-dimensional policy space, the median voter theorem provides a unique equilibrium characterization under simple majority rule. But for general decision procedures, the core is generically non-unique. We make a selection from the core by taking the limit equilibrium of a standard bargaining...

This paper experimentally examines a procedurally fair provision mechanism allowing members of a small community to determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experiments with positive cost projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is...

Diermeier and Fong (2008a) recently proposed a legislative bargaining model with reconsideration in the context of a distributive policy environment. In this paper we prove general existence and necessary conditions for pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space and...

A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly...

A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly...

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

We provide a bargaining foundation for the concept of ratio equilibrium in public good economies. We define a bargaining game of alternating offers in which players bargain to determine their cost shares of public good production and a level of public good. We study the stationary subgame...