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Deeds rather than omissions : how intended consequences provoke negative reciprocity
Schubert, Manuel - 2012
Intention-based models of reciprocity argue that people assess kindness by measuring the intended consequences of … alternatives and realized payoffs. Aggregate results suggest that intended consequences only weakly matter for negative reciprocity … invariant to intended consequences of actual behavior. -- Intentions ; reciprocity ; kindness ; gender …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009557630
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Bargaining and time preferences : an experimental study
Kim, Jeongbin; Lim, Wooyoung; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, … - 2020
We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012312122
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Bargaining and time preferences : an experimental study
Kim, Jeongbin; Lim, Wooyoung; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, … - 2020
We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012266524
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Patience is power : bargaining and payoff delay
Kim, Jeongbin; Lim, Wooyoung; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, … - 2023
We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is sufficient for a unique equilibrium, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014279476
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Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2011
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051881
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On the Nature of Reciprocity : Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure
Nicklisch, Andreas - 2011
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the … reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. The treatment effect is unaccounted for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123808
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The Impact of Compulsory Arbitration on Bargaining Behavior - an Experimental Study
Kritikos, Alexander - 2002
A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior in a Rubinstein game under three different settings: no arbitration, conventional and final offer arbitration. Under no arbitration disputes with zero payoffs were around 10%, while the pie was equally split in less than half of the cases....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014111361
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Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining
Conrads, Julian - 2011
In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118529
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Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
Hennig‐Schmidt, Heike - 2013
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074889
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Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191262