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Contract, renegotiation, and hold up : results on the technology of trade and investment

Buzard, Kristy; Watson, Joel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 283-322

, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts ("non-forcing contracts … that, with ex post renegotiation, constraining parties to use "forcing contracts" implies a strict reduction in the set of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690733

The 15-years-long emergency, the burial-of-the-dead conflict and the ultimatum game.

Villani, Salvatore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258906

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571

Bargaining and distribution of power in the EU's Conciliation Committee

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2003

The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful "codecision makers", understanding of the final stage of the procedure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001912496

Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the Strategic Sequencing of Bilateral Negotiations

Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin - 2011

This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. We show that the sequencing matters to the buyer only when equilibrium trade can be inefficient. In this case, the buyer begins with the less powerful...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179147

When Rationality and Fairness Conflict : The Role of Cognitive-Control in the Ultimatum Game

Halali, Eliran; Bereby-Meyer, Yoella; Meiran, Nachshon - 2011

The ultimatum game models social exchange in situations in which the rational motive to maximize gains conflicts with fairness considerations. Using two independent behavioral measurements, the authors tested two contradicting predictions: that the preference for fairness is a deliberative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181014

Bargaining Chains (Long Version)

Lovejoy, William S. - 2010

We consider a firm that designs a new product and wishes to bring it to market, but does not have ownership or control over all of the resources required to make that happen. The firm must select and contract with one of several possible tier 1 suppliers for necessary inputs, who do the same...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045118

Unequal Shadows : Negotiation Theory and Spousal Support Under Canadian Divorce Law

Martin, Craig - 2009

There has been considerable academic consideration of the adverse economic impact of divorce upon women in Canada. However, most of the attention has been focused on the manner in which the law has been interpreted by the courts. Yet less than 10 per cent of the all divorce settlements are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222655

Strategic Self-Interest Can Explain Seemingly 'Fair' Offers in the Ultimatum Game

Wells, Jordan; Rand, David G. - 2013

Behavioral and economic analysis of law fundamentally depends on understanding what motivates individual actors. While it is often assumed that people care only about maximizing their own monetary payoff, recent experimental work has challenged this assumption. A canonical example involves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166293

The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation

Watson, Joel; Brennan, Jim - 2002

We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete but unverifiable information, using the mechanism …-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modelled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so that … noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts to a constraint on the problem. We formalize and clarify the Renegotiation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113645