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Jackson, Matthew O. - 2016

Negotiation involves determining not only an agreement's price, but also its content, which typically has many aspects. We model such negotiations and provide conditions under which negotiation leads to efficient outcomes, even in the face of substantial asymmetric information regarding the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005057

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Transparent matching mechanisms

Möller, Markus - 2024

efficiency only if they are dictatorial. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014533360

A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution

Kim, Jin Yeub - 2017

This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971425

Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining

Conrads, Julian - 2011

In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118529

Contract Design with Limited Commitment

Wambach, Achim - 2019

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895796

An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure

Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712

Strategic ignorance in bargaining

Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009517429

The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment

Kim, Kyungmin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 17-44

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699204

Beyond Dividing the Pie : An Experimental Study on Bargaining over Multiple Issues

Bochet, Olivier - 2020

information can have a detrimental effect on efficiency, in particular in large-surplus negotiations. Our findings have broad …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848706