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Bargaining over divorce settlements and child support

Farmer, Amy; Tiefenthaler, Jill M. - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000903970

Bargaining with informative offers : an analysis of final-offer arbitration

Farmer, Amy - In: The journal of legal studies 27 (1998) 2, pp. 415-432

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001247242

Bargaining with voluntary transmission of private information : does the use of final offer arbitration impede settlement?

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 19 (2003) 1, pp. 64-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001761706

Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 48 (2002) 2, pp. 163-176

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001662828

Strategic bargaining over child support and visitation

Farmer, Amy; Tiefenthaler, Jill M. - In: Review of Economics of the Household 1 (2003) 3, pp. 205-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001787564

Bargaining and arbitration with asymmetric uncertainty

Deck, Cary A.; Farmer, Amy - In: Aspects of worker well-being, (pp. 415-445). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003474346

Bargaining over an uncertain value : arbitration mechanisms compared

Deck, Cary A.; Farmer, Amy - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 23 (2007) 3, pp. 547-579

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003545545

Pretrial settlement with fairness

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 54 (2004) 3, pp. 287-296

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002105698

Litigation with a variable cost of trial

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 12 (2016) 2, pp. 203-226

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507229

Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - 2012

We develop a model with asymmetric information, where the uninformed party makes the offer. When parties proceed to trial, their endogenous expenditures partially determine the outcome. The endogenous spending at trial can either strengthen or weaken the bargaining position of the uninformed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191996