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Rationality and emotions in ultimatum bargaining

Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: Annales d'économie et de statistique (2001), pp. 1-31

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001582249

Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior

Abbink, Klaus (contributor); Sadrieh, Abdolkarim (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001692005

Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior

Abbink, Klaus; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 57 (2004) 1, pp. 25-57

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002643296

An experiment with ultimatum bargining in a changing environment

Winter, Eyal; Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 56 (2005) 3, pp. 363-385

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003120650

A model of bargaining with incomplete information

Zamir, Shemuʾel; Karni, Edi - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003398312

Handbook of game theory ; Volume 4

Young, H. Peyton (ed.); Zamir, Shemuʾel (ed.) - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011484738

A simple bargaining mechanism that elicits truthful reservation prices

Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - In: Group decision and negotiation 24 (2015) 3, pp. 401-413

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533313

A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices

Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2012

We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989