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We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in bargaining settings. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggest a split between himself, the responder and a char-itable donation. By reneging on initial pledges,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012534829
We propose and experimentally test a mechanism for a class of principal-agent problems in which agents can observe each others' efforts. In this mechanism each player costlessly assigns a share of the pie to each of the other players, after observing their contributions, and the final...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515831
information about their types; that is, they do not exactly know their private valuations. We suggest a learning model according …. This shows that imperfect information and a very simple boundedly rational model of learning can circumvent the Myerson …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028400
good. Information generation takes time and is endogenous. After learning, the buyer can disclose verifiable evidence of … sometimes feature significant delay due to endogenous costly learning. The buyer receives informational rents for any period …-length only if learning is costly. The high-frequency limits of stationary equilibria result in a folk- theorem type of result …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832420
We examine the voluntary participation problem in negotiations on providing public goods. In contrast to earlier studies, negotiation is followed by renegotiation in our model. First, players decide whether to participate in a negotiation, and the participants produce a public good. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014343702
This paper analyses the role of ratification quotas in multilateral agreements over emission reduction. The higher is the quota, the lower is the level of emissions in case the agreement comes into force, but the higher is also the risk of failure. In a setting with incomplete information, two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439371
We examine a monopolistic supplier's decision about a pure public good when he/she must negotiate with beneficiaries of the good. In our model, while the level of the public good is decided unilaterally by the supplier, the cost share of the public good is negotiated between the supplier and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338329
A profit-maximizing public good supplier endogenously determines the level of the public good and simultaneously negotiates with beneficiaries of the good one by one. A pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903962
Conditional cooperation is an important factor in voluntary cooperation. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that in public good games conditional cooperation among rational players is feasible if cooperators are sufficiently inequality averse and if there are not too many free riders. The derived...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941202
We report on an experiment comparing two institutions governing bargaining over public good allocations. In our setting, two parties bargain over how to allocate a fixed endowment between a public good and two private accounts, one for each party. Parties attach either high or low weight to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014262141