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Assignment games with externalities and matching-based Cournot competition

Chen, Bo - 2013

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642

The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022 - Revised August 2022

We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252972

Externalities and Renegotiations in Three-Player Coalitional Bargaining

Gomes, Armando R. - 2004

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050

An experimental Nash program : a comparison of non-cooperative v.s. cooperative bargaining experiments

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2023

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Nash program by experimentally comparing the results of "structured" (non-cooperative) demand-based and offer-based mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an ex-ante equilibrium outcome with the results of corresponding "semi-structured"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451922

Chapter 16. Formation of Networks and Coalitions

Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 729-779). 2011

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … covers models of group and network formation by farsighted players and in dynamic contexts. The chapter concludes with a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687

Learning from a Piece of Pie : The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining

Chiappori, Pierre-André; Donni, Olivier - 2006

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set a parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058235

Learning from a piece of pie : the empirical content of Nash bargaining

Chiappori, Pierre-André (contributor); … - 2006

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters [lamda] that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003388467

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor); … - 2007

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672

Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256

On the Sensitivity Matrix of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan; Douven, Rudy - 2006

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15],...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065513