This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the...

Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a...

We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...

We propose a five-player common-pool resource (CPR) game with endogenous coalition formation. We show that the level of extraction from the CPR depends on the size of each coalition that is formed and on the final coalition structure. These predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment. We...

We examine how a principal implements a joint forcing contract for a team of two agents, whose joint product determines the value of the principal's asset. We focus on the "agents' problem": whether to contribute to a public good when one's costly contribution is unobservable. Our experiments...

We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of...

We report on an experiment comparing two institutions governing bargaining over public good allocations. In our setting, two parties bargain over how to allocate a fixed endowment between a public good and two private accounts, one for each party. Parties attach either high or low weight to the...

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not assessed the underlying self-regulatory and physiological principles. Integrating insights from research on the social functions of emotions and the bio-psychosocial model as proposed by...

Agenda-setting power is a double-edged sword that increases the likelihood that an agent is chosen to be a proposer, but may reduce the probability that the agent is included in a winning coalition. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction of potentially negative returns to...

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...